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The CPSU and Its Members: Between
Communism and Postcommunism
STEPHEN WHITE AND IAN MCALLISTER*
Once dominant and unchallenged throughout the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
rapidly lost authority in the last two years of Soviet rule. Banned by Russian presidential decree
after the failure of the attempted coup of August 1991, it was re-established in February 1993
and soon became the largest of the postcommunist parties. A 1992 survey of current and former
party members as well as other Russians found that members were characterized by a relatively
high degree of activism. They were disproportionately male, more affluent than non-members,
and better provided with consumer goods. Younger respondents and religious believers were
more likely to have left the party than their older colleagues. Those who still regarded themselves
as party members were the most likely to oppose economic reform and support the collectivist
principles of the communist era, particularly if they were activists; but the differences between
members and non-members were not substantial, and both were found to hold generally
pessimistic views on the postcommunist system. These findings suggest that, although former
members will continue to be influential, CPSU membership is by itself likely to play a limited
part in shaping the political direction of postcommunist Russia.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the dominant institution within
the political system over which it presided. Indeed, for many, it was in fact itself
the system, its 'central and defining characteristic'.' Its ideology was mandatory
in public life, including education and culture, and could not legitimately be
challenged. The party enjoyed an effective electoral monopoly, and, after 1977,
a formal monopoly of political initiative through Article 6 of the Constitution,
which described it as the 'leading and guiding force of Soviet society [and] the
nucleus of its political system'. The party exercised a dominant influence in the
Soviets at all levels through the party groups that were active within them, and
which (to quote the party rules) were 'strictly and unswervingly bound by the
decisions' of the CPSU hierarchy. The key power of appointment was reserved
for party committees through the nomenklatura system. Party members were
well represented at all levels of society, with about 10 per cent of adults, a third
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of all urban males and a third of all college graduates within its ranks.2 The party
controlled the mass media, and in the last resort it could bring its influence to
bear through the law courts, the police or the armed forces. No wonder, perhaps,
that an emigre of the 1970s was reduced to a Biblical metaphor: 'the party', he
explained, 'is like God: it's everywhere'.3
By the end of 1991, after a dramatic process of political change throughout
the communist world, there was no longer a ruling Communist Party or indeed
a Soviet Union. The party had initiated perestroika, but had itself been very slow
to reflect the process of democratization that had transformed the representative
system, government and citizen politics. There had certainly been formal
changes in its position, with the ending of the constitutionally guaranteed
monopoly in 1990 and a series of modifications to the party rules designed to
increase the rights of ordinary members. Yet the process of democratization
served in the end to undermine the position of the ruling party that had initiated
it. At the largely competitive elections of 1989, and again in 1990, party officials
suffered heavy losses. Glasnost' exposed the party's misgovernment to public
scrutiny. A civil society began to form outside the framework of party
dominance, first as 'informals' and then as independent parties (which were able
to operate on a legal basis from October 1990). The party began to split;
members began to leave; its finances began to crumble. The attempted coup of
1991, in which its leadership appeared to be implicated, was the final blow.
Gorbachev resigned from the leadership and called for the Central Committee
to dissolve itself; the Russian president Boris Yeltsin suspended the party and
then banned it altogether; and the party's buildings and assets were taken into
state ownership.4
A year or two later, it was less clear that the CPSU had vanished into the
'dustbin of history' or that it had lost the political dominance it had enjoyed for
more than seventy years. The Russian government was certainly a non-commu-
nist one, but it was predominantly composed of former members: Yeltsin
himself, nearly thirty years in the party's ranks, had been a member of its
Secretariat and Politburo, and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had been a member
of the Central Committee. In the former republics first secretaries like Leonid
2
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Kravchuk, Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbaev had become the elected
presidents of sovereign states, and sometimes headed post-communist ruling
parties. At local level an estimated 80-90 per cent of executive positions were
held by their former incumbents.5 The Communist Party, moreover, had
revived, following a ruling by the Constitutional Court that the ban on its activity
had been illegal (the Court did accept it had been legitimate to suppress the
party's central organs, which had usurped the Soviet government itself).6
Several communist groupings, after the ban, had laid claim to the position and
(still more so) to the property of the former CPSU; in February 1993 most of
them came together to hold a second congress of the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation and to establish a broader grouping of parties across the
former Soviet republics.7 The new party claimed a membership of more than
600,000, making it by far the largest of the actors in the postcommunist system;8
communist groupings, meanwhile, enjoyed substantial support in the opinion
polls, and (with their allies) took about a third of the party-list seats in the State
Duma elections in December 1993.9
In this article, drawing on a Russia-wide representative survey that was
conducted in January and February 1992, we address three related issues that
emerge from this complex experience. The first is: what did it mean to be a party
member in the late communist period? How many were active members, and
in what did their activity consist? How many read the party press, attended
meetings, or took a part in political life in other ways? Secondly, we ask: how
united was the CPSU in the late communist period? Did party members,
compared with others, have similar views on the issues of the day? How did the
views of those who left the party compare with those that remained? And thirdly,
taking account of the fragility of democratic institutions in early postcommunist
Russia, we examine the views of those who define themselves as current party
members on economic change and political democracy. The Communist Party,
as we have noted, accounted for the largest proportion of the limited
membership of all political parties in postcommunist Russia; and a further
5
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Political Formations', Journal of Communist Studies, 8 (1993), 280-92.
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proportion were former members of the CPSU, whose views are also
represented in our survey. The CPSU and its present or former members are
accordingly a major influence upon the political direction of postcommunist
Russia; more generally, the willingness of formerly hegemonic parties and their
members to accept the 'rules of the game' is a central determinant of the complex
process of transition from authoritarian to more pluralist forms of politics.10
THE PARTY IN LATE COMMUNIST RUSSIA
The attempt to reform the CPSU went back to the 19th Party Conference in 1988.
Why, asked Gorbachev, had the CPSU, based as it was on democratic principles
and popular support, been unable to resist the 'deformations of socialism' that
had been associated with Stalin's cult of personality? And why, after this, had
it limited itself to 'superficial changes', allowing social development to
stagnate? The answer, Gorbachev suggested, was that there had been
deformations in the party itself, involving the loss of its links with the wider
society and the end of many 'democratic Bolshevik traditions'. The whole party,
it was clear, needed to change its methods of work, from ordinary branches up
to the Central Committee. Members and branches had lost their ability to
influence party policy. The full-time apparatus had become dominant,
sometimes even corrupt, and democratic centralism had become bureaucratic
centralism, based upon directives and commands." The Conference, in its
concluding resolutions, agreed with Gorbachev that a 'profound democratiza-
tion' of party life was necessary. Branches should have more autonomy.
Membership should be determined by the moral and political qualities of the
applicant rather than by centrally determined quotas. Party meetings should be
more open, and less dominated by officials. Central Committee members should
be able to play a more active part in the formulation of party policy. More records
of party meetings should be published. And - a matter of 'prime importance' -
all posts up to Central Committee level should be filled by secret and competitive
ballot for a maximum of two five-year terms.12
The process of change was still continuing, as the party entered the last years
of its existence; but it was already clear that a start had been made in a process
of democratization that was intended to shift power from party officials to
ordinary members. Competitive elections to party posts had in fact begun in
1987; by the end of the year more than a hundred local secretaries had been
chosen on this basis.13 In late 1988 the Central Committee approved the
10
 See, for instance, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986), chap. 4.
'' Materialy XIX Vsesoyuznoi konferentsii 28 iyunya - 1 iyulya 1988 goda (Moscow: Politizdat,
1988), pp. 70-2.
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The CPSU and Its Members 109
formation of six new commissions on party affairs, ideology, social and
economic policy, agriculture, international affairs and law reform, all of them
headed by a senior member of the leadership. In October 1990 the commissions
were reorganized and extended, effectively superseding the Central Committee
Secretariat.l4 The Central Committee apparatus was reduced in size and scope;l5
and more information began to be published about party affairs, particularly
through the revived Central Committee journal Izvestiya TsKKPSS. In February
1990 the party agreed to surrender its constitutional monopoly, or more
accurately to acknowledge that it no longer existed.16 At the 28th Congress, in
July 1990, there were still more significant moves to democratize the party's
own operation. Members, for instance, could for the first time be religious
believers17 and they were given the right to form 'platforms', if not organized
factions. The rights of minorities were strengthened, and 'horizontal' structures,
of a kind that had previously been regarded as incompatible with democratic
centralism, were explicitly endorsed.18
This was still, by 1991, some distance from the 'updated CPSU', working
through parliament as well as workplaces, allowing 'total freedom of debate',
and co-operating with other 'progressive' social and political forces, for which
Gorbachev had called in his opening address. For a start, the party had been
restructuring itself rather more slowly than other public institutions. As a Central
Committee official told Pravda in early 1989, district committees still kept their
records secret, and the rank and file were 'walled off from their activities.19
More than a thousand local party secretaries had been elected on a competitive
basis, but this was only 8.6 per cent of the total; and at regional level only seven
first secretaries had been elected on a competitive basis, just 1 per cent of the
total. This compared with 74 per cent of the members of the Congress of
People's Deputies who had been elected in March 1989 from a choice of
candidates - 'a difference hardly in favour of the party' .20 It was argued, indeed,
that the Communist Party was the only institution not to democratize during the
years of perestroika, remaining a 'Stalinist construction' as the society changed
14
 Pravda, 1 October 1988, p. 1 (the membership is listed in Pravda, 29 November 1988, pp. 1-2);
Materialy Tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS 8-9 oktyabrya 1990 goda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990),
p. 201.
15
 Izvestiya TsKKPSS, no. 1 (1989), pp. 81-9.
16
 It was in these terms that Gorbachev presented the decision: Materialy Tsentral'nogo komiteta
KPSS S-7fevralya 1990 goda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 9-10.
17
 Gorbachev drew attention to this change in his address to the July 1991 Central Committee
plenary meeting: Pravda, 26 July 1991, p. 2. In a survey conducted in December 1992, 33 per cent
of former CPSU members said that they believed in God, 40 per.cent said they did not, and the
remaining 27 per cent either offered no response or found the question difficult to answer (Institut
prikladnoi politiki, 'Politicheskie partii Rossii')-
18
 The amended party rules are in Materialy XXV11I s "ezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo
Soyuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1990), pp. 108-24.
19
 Leon Onikov in Pravda, 2 January 1989, p. 2.
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TABLE 1 The Social Composition of the CPSU in 1990
Number Percentage
Total membership
Candidates
Women
Age groups
<2O
21-25
26-30
31^0
41-50
51-60
>60
Education
Higher
Incomplete higher
Secondary
Primary
Less than primary
Employment status
Workers
Collective farmers
White-collar staff
Students
Pensioners and housewives
Others
Source: Adapted from hvestiya TsK KPSS, No. 4 (1990), pp. 113-15.
around it.21 As studies of this kind suggested, there was a widening
'democratization gap' between the CPSU and the society it claimed to
represent;22 and as party leaders themselves accepted, the process of reform was
advancing 'very slowly' in the CPSU's own branches.23
Not simply was the 'vanguard lagging'; it was also shrinking, particularly
among the social groups whose interests it was supposed to represent. The rate
of increase in CPSU membership dropped in 1988 to a scarcely measurable 0.1
per cent, and then in 1989 membership actually fell, for the first time since the
1950s (the size and composition of party membership, as they stood at the
21
 Onikov in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 March 1993, p. 2; similarly in Argumenty ifakty, 1992,
no. 28, pp. 1, 4.
22
 Pravda, 2 January 1989, p. 2.
23
 Vladimir Ivashko in Pravda, 2 February 1991, p. 2.
19,228,217
372,104
5,813,610
38,553
645,091
2,001,936
5,002,311
3,682,076
3,844,212
4,014,038
6,808,715
358,350
8,605,207
1,154,880
54,570
5,313,524
1,466,361
7,793,048
101,415
3,344,981
1,208,888
1.9
30.2
0.2
3.4
10.4
26.0
19.1
20.0
20.9
35.4
1.9
44.7
6.0
0.3
27.6
7.6
40.5
0.5
17.4
6.3
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beginning of this process of decline, are set out in Table 1 ).24 The fall continued
into 1990 and 1991, with the party losing about a quarter of its members over
a period of eighteen months.25 The proportion of industrial workers among those
leaving the party was particularly high;26 so too was the proportion of younger
members, leaving a membership that was composed 'predominantly of
bureaucrats and intellectuals'.27 Those who remained within the party became
increasingly uncertain of their membership, according to contemporary
surveys;28 and they became increasingly reluctant to part with their membership
dues, which had in any case been reduced by the 28th Congress. By October
1990 more than a million members were behind with their payments, and a
'regime of severe economy' had to be instituted.29 At the same time the party
press, which had previously contributed to central funds, lost subscribers and
began to run at a loss; Pravda alone lost about 70 per cent of its subscribers in
the course of 1990.30 By the summer of 1991 expenditure was running at almost
twice the level of party income.31
An increasing level of non-payment was in turn related to a collapse of
discipline in an organization that had once prided itself on its 'monolithic unity'.
There were grass-roots revolts against local leaderships throughout the winter
of 1989 and early 1990: in Volgograd and Tyumen', in Voroshilovgrad and
Donetsk, in Kostroma and Cheboksary, in Ufa and Sverdlovsk.32 There were
increasingly open divisions among the membership at large, and even factions.
For writers like the jurist Boris Kurashvili, in 1989, there were at least two
parties within the CPSU, one of 'democratic socialism' and one of 'communist
construction'.33 For the playwright Mikhail Shatrov there were three, four or five
parties within the CPSU in early 1990;34 and for the then director of the Higher
Party School, Vyacheslav Shostakovsky, there were as many as eight distinct
tendencies within the party, including a 'silent majority'.35 The months before
the 28th Congress, in early 1990, saw the formation of organized and
co-ordinated groupings of this kind, including the Democratic Platform - which
favoured a parliamentary rather than a vanguard party - and the Marxist
24
 See Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague, 'Soviet Communist Party loses members', Radio
Liberty/Radio Free Europe Report on the USSR, 18 May 1990, pp. 1-3.
25
 Pravda, 26 July 1991, p . 2.
26
 Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya, 1991, no. 3, pp. 14-15.
27
 Harasymiw, 'Changes in the Party's Composition', p. 133.
28
 Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 8 (1989), p . 8.
29
 Pravda, 12 October 1990, p . 3 , and (for 'severe economy ' ) Pravda, 12 March 1990, p. 3.
30
 Argumenty ifakty, no. 48 (1990), p . 1.
31
 Pravda, 29 July 1991, p. 2.
32
 See respectively Izvestiya, 28 January 1990,p.4,and 19January 1990, p. 3;Pravda, 15February
1990, p. 2, 26 February 1990, p. 3, 1 March 1990, p. 2, 11 February 1990, p. 2, and 13 February
1990, p. 3.
33
 See Yu. Burt in, ed., Pul's Reform ( M o s c o w : Progress , 1989), p . 7 1 .
34
 Pravda, 1 February 1990, p . 2.
35
 Politicheskeskoe obrazovanie, no. 18 (1990), p. 6.
112 WHITEANDMcALLISTER
Platform, which favoured a stronger emphasis upon working-class interests.36
The republican party organizations of Lithuania, Georgia and Moldova left the
CPSU entirely; the other Baltic party organizations split into pro-Moscow and
independent sections; and in a further variation, several regional party
organizations — among them the Komi and Bashkir — formally arrogated to
themselves the status of republican parties.37
Party members were accordingly in a state of some confusion during the last
months and years of communist rule. The most fundamental problem, in the
view of delegates to the 28th Congress, was the lack of a clear vision of the kind
of society the party was attempting to construct.38 At the same time there was
little agreement among party members about the nature of the policies that party
and state leaderships were promoting. Members, for a start, were almost equally
divided on the merits of communism: 38 per cent (in a 1991 survey) were in
favour, but 40 per cent against it.39 Party members were just as divided on the
private ownership of land, with 46 per cent in favour and almost as many
opposed. The repressive action that had been taken in the Baltic republics in
early 1991 was supported by 33 per cent of members (who attributed the
difficulties to the unconstitutional action of the republican authorities), but
opposed by 35 per cent. So far as the party itself was concerned, 40 per cent
supported a reorganization on federal lines, with nearly as many (39 per cent)
against any changes of this nature.40 Was it one or two distinct parties that had
met at the April 1991 Central Committee plenum, asked a member of the
Russian party's Central Committee? And would it not be better to formalize the
divisions that clearly existed, acknowledging that too high a price had been paid
for the 'sham unity' of the late communist period?41
CPSU MEMBERSHIP AND ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND
We begin our analysis of party membership in the late communist and early
postcommunist period by examining its size, level of activism and social
composition (see Table 2).42 In total, 12 per cent of those interviewed said they
36
 Pravda, 29 July 1991 , p . 3 .
37
 On the developments see Hill, 'The CPSU', pp. 217-35, and Rees, ed., Soviet Communist Party,
pp. 2(M.
38
 Izvestiya TsK KPSS, no. 8 (1990), p. 133.
39
 Novoe vremya, no. 12 (1991), p. 13.
40
 Pravda, 26 February 1991, p . 3.
41
 Izvestiya, 24 May 1991, p . 4 .
42
 The data are from the 1992 New Russia Barometer survey, collected by the All-Russian Centre
for the Study of Public Opinion between 26 January and 25 February 1992. The sample was based
upon the urban population aged 16 years and over, resident in the Russian Federation. The survey
was conducted by means of personal interviews; the effective response rate was 82.9 per cent. The
total sample size was 2,106, weighted by education to reflect the national population. A fuller account
of the survey and the other results that were obtained is provided in Irina Boeva and Viacheslav
Shironin, Russians between State and Market: The Generations Compared (Glasgow: Centre for the
Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, SPP 205, 1992).
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TABLE 2 CPSU Membership, Timing of Resignation and Level of
Activism*
Membership Timing of resignation! Level of activismt
Member
(Current)
(Previous)
Never a
member
12 After August 1991 30
(2) January-August 1991 23
(10) 1985-90 39
88 Before 1985
2 One day per week
Few hours a week
^ One hour per week
8 Inactive
22
25
28
25
Total 100
(2,106)
Total
(AO
100 Total
(214) (AO
100
(251)
* The questions were: 'Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?'; [If left the
Communist Party] 'when was that?'; [If member] 'about how much time did you spend on party
work?'
t Estimated only for previous members.
X Estimated for past and present members combined.
Source: 1992 New Russian Barometer Survey.
were or had been CPSU members, a figure that corresponds closely to the
proportion of adults that were members of the party at the end of the 1980s.43
And although the party was no longer legal at the time of the survey, about 2
per cent of those who were asked still identified themselves as members.
Membership, by this time, could clearly exist in an affective sense only, as
decrees adopted immediately after the attempted coup of August 1991 had
suspended all party activities throughout the Russian Federation and placed
party finances and assets, including buildings, under the control of local
Soviets.44 In November 1991, in a further series of decrees, the party was
suppressed entirely, its organizational structures were 'disbanded', and its
property was transferred into state ownership.45
Among those who had resigned their party membership, in our survey, just
under one in three had done so following the failed coup, and around a quarter
had resigned in the six months immediately prior to the coup. In total, then, the
party lost more than half of its membership among the survey population in the
period between January 1991 and the time when the survey was conducted, in
February 1992. A significant proportion (39 per cent) had resigned between
43
 The actual figure for CPSU membership in the unweighted data is considerably higher.
However, we have weighted the data by education, to make it more representative of the general
population, and since education is highly correlated with party membership (see Table 2) this
necessarily reduces the estimates.
44
 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 27 August 1991, p. 3, and hvestiya, 30 August 1991, p. 2.
45
 Izvestiya, 5 November 1991, p. 1 (funds frozen), and Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 November 1991,
p. 2.
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1985 and 1990, the years of perestroika; only 8 per cent said they had left in
the years before 1985. Finally, the data show that the CPSU was able to rely
on a comparatively high level of activism among its members. Only a quarter
could be considered completely inactive, while three-quarters gave at least an
hour or more every week to party affairs. Indeed, no fewer than 22 per cent of
our sample were in the party' s part-time service, devoting at least one day a week
to party work. These are very high levels of activism in comparative terms.46
The data enable us to examine the social composition of the CPSU, and to
evaluate the social characteristics of activists, using a wider range of variables
than has hitherto been available. Table 3 shows that ordinary party members,
in our survey as in the official statistics reported in Table 1, were
disproportionately male. Activists, however, were much more evenly balanced:
this accords with other evidence that (for instance) women were more likely than
men to be members of the Komsomol, and that unmarried women were more
likely to be politically active than their male counterparts.47 Party members (but
not necessarily activists) were also more likely to have had a higher education
than non-members: about a third of members and activists had been to college
or university, about three times as high as the proportion of graduates among
the society as a whole.48 The survey also enables us to go further in examining
socio-economic status, a matter on which official party statistics were notably
uninformative. Members, clearly, were more affluent than their non-party
colleagues, with a total family income of around 400 roubles a month more than
non-members. They were also better provided with consumer goods. Measured
by the possession of three such goods - a car, a telephone and a dacha - party
members were about one and a half times as likely to possess them as their
non-party counterparts. In terms of their religious beliefs, party members were
twice as likely to declare themselves non-believers as their counterparts outside
party ranks, although believers (in fact) just outnumbered non-believers among
the membership as a whole. Among the party membership, activism (judged by
those who worked several hours a week on party business) was similarly
dependent upon education and age. Activists, more generally, were very similar
in their characteristics to the membership as a whole: appropriate, perhaps, in
a party that demanded a high level of active commitment from all its members.
46
 See, for instance, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, Labour's Grassroots: The Politics of Party
Membership (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
•
 47
 See V. G. Mordkovich, 'Obshchestvenno-politicheskaya aktivnost' trudyashchikhsya' (av-
toreferat doktorskoi dissertatsii, Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii institut, 1974), p. 25
(Komsomol); and Trud i Uchnost' pri sotsializme, vyp. 2 (Perm': Permskii gosudarstvennyi
universitet, 1973), p. 46, and V. N. Ermuratsky, ed., Sotsial'naya aktivnost' rabotnikov
promyshlennogo predpriyatiya (Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1973), p. 110.
48
 In the early 1980s, for instance, 76 in every 1,000 members of the population aged 10 or over
had a higher education, or 110 for every 1,000 members of the labour force (Narodnoe khozyaistvo
SSSR 1922-1982: Yubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1982), p. 42.
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7*
26
19**
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22
0
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6*
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28*
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8
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13
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TABLE 3 The Social Composition of CPSU Membership
Percentages of each group, unless All Activists Never
otherwise stated members only members
Gender (male) 60** 50 43
Age
<20
21-25
26-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
>60
Ethnic Russian 94 95 92
Resident of European Russia^ 69* 71* 61
Resident of Moscow, St Petersberg 15 16 13
Education
Higher 33** 33** 12
Incomplete higher 3 3 3
Secondary 53** 57 62
Primary 6 6 7
Less than primary 5** 1* 16
Family income (mean, thousands of roubles per
month) 2.5** 2.4* 2.1
Consumer goods (mean, 0 to 7>)% 1.5** 1.5** 1.0
Religion
Believer 40** 39** 54
Non-believer 37** 40** 18
Difficult to answer 23 21* 28
(AO (255) (116) (716)
** Statistically different from never members at p< 0.01, */><0.05, two-tailed.
t Defined as residence in the northwestern and central regions, including Volga-Vyatskii, Volga,
Moscow, Udmurt, Vladimir and Cherepovets regions or republics.
t Car, telephone, dacha.
Source: As for Table 2.
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EXPLAINING THE DECLINE OF THE CPSU
Who left the CPSU during the last months, and why? Surveys conducted in late
1990, based upon interviews with those who left and a study of their personal
files, suggested that increasing numbers were leaving the party voluntarily: 35
per cent had left 'on the basis of a personal declaration' in 1989, but more than
twice as many (74 per cent) left on the same basis in 1990. The typical leaver,
at the same time, had changed relatively little: for the most part they were male
industrial workers aged between 30 and 50 with a secondary education, who had
been in the party for ten years or more, and who for the most part had suffered
no disciplinary sanctions. Most of those who left had begun to question their
membership in 1989 or 1990 (41 per cent alone had begun to do so after the 28th
Party Congress in July 1990). The great majority, equally, had no doubt they
had taken the right decision. What reasons did they give for leaving? For 26 per
cent of the former members that were asked it was a 'lack of belief in the CPSU
as an agency of political direction', including dissatisfaction with the quality of
its leadership. For another 26 per cent it was the 'lack of real value from their
personal participation in party work'; and for a further 25 per cent it was their
'reluctance to remain in the same party as unworthy people', including corrupt
officials. Another 17 per cent (more than one response could be given) were
disillusioned withperestroika, and 14 percent were disenchanted with socialism
itself.49
Clearly, in early 1992, it was difficult to establish why individuals had left
the CPSU (or chosen not to do so) at an earlier point in their biography. Using
cross-sectional data to ascertain why individuals made choices of this kind is
fraught with difficulties, methodological as well as conceptual, since respon-
dents are being asked to recollect their feelings at an earlier and often
comparatively remote point in time. Respondents may have difficulty in
recalling their real reasons for adopting a particular course of action; in other
cases, they may project their current feelings on to their past actions, or present
reasons that have been vindicated by the passage of time. In still other cases they
may wish to conceal their true motives (for instance, that they had joined the
party to advance their careers and left when membership was no longer
associated with this kind of advantage). One method of ascertaining why
respondents might have left the CPSU was to ask them their opinions of party
members, using this as an indirect means of establishing their own feelings about
the party and possible reasons for leaving. The survey contained a battery of ten
items designed to tap these feelings, which were asked only of current or former
party members; these results appear in Table 4.
In general all party members, including activists, were inclined to mention
images of their fellow members that were associated with careerist motives of
49
 Akademiya obshchestvennykh nauk TsK KPSS, Tsentr sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii,
Politicheskaya sotsiologiya: Informatsionnyi byulleten', no. 3 (1991), pp. 14-16 (we are grateful to
Simon Clarke for making this source available to us).
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TABLE 4 CPSU Members' Images of Communists*
Percentage of each group All Activists
mentioning: members only
Altruism
Trying to help other people
Intelligent, good specialists
Idealists
Compulsion
Had to join to get job, promotion
Had to join to participate in social activities
Used party for own purposes
Negativism
Dishonest
Interfere in other's business
Uneducated, unprofessional
(.N) (255) (116)
* The question was 'Here are phrases that are sometimes used to describe former party members.
Which do you think fits most?'
Source: As for Table 2.
some kind, particularly the view that members 'had to join to get a job or
promotion', which was mentioned by 51 percent of the total CPSU subsample.
However, significant numbers also suggested that membership was necessary
to engage in social activities, and a similar number took the view that members
used the party for their own purposes. Altruistic images of party members were
less frequently mentioned, although one in five thought that members were
'trying to help other people'; very few, however, considered that intelligence
or idealism were accurate descriptions of party members. Comparatively few
mentioned explicitly negative images, such as dishonesty (12 percent) or a lack
of education or professionalism (3 per cent). As we might expect, activists were
more likely to see the party in a favourable light than were the membership as
a whole, but in general the differences are not large. The two factors that related
most closely to the decision to leave were age (younger respondents were more
likely to have left the party than older members, net of other factors) and
religious belief. In terms of the timing of such a decision, those with a higher
education were significantly more likely than former members as a whole to
have resigned in the early 1990s rather than the 1980s: an indication, perhaps,
of the close association that still existed between party membership, education,
occupation and material advantages.
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ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL REFORM
Judged against the various other social groups in early postcommunist Russia,
former CPSU members had an important - perhaps even crucial - role in the
process of economic and political reform. Although about one in ten of the adult
population were current or former CPSU members, this proportion increased
significantly among those in leading political and economic positions. Indeed
it was appropriate, for some scholars, to speak of a 'neonomenklatura' .50 In the
Russian presidential administration, by 1994, fully 75 per cent were former
members of the communist ruling group; 74.3 per cent of the Russian
government, and as many as 82.3 per cent of the local elite, were from the same
origins.51 In the wider society, about a third of all those with a higher education,
and a comparable proportion of those in professional positions, were current or
former party members.52 In short, the economic and political opinions of CPSU
members were likely to have a disproportionate impact upon the process of
reform in postcommunist Russia, whether communist parties were legal or (as
in 1991 and again in 1993) temporarily suspended. To evaluate their likely
influence in this process, in the concluding part of this article we consider the
attitudes of current and former party members to economic reform and their
views on the development of the Russian political system more generally.
Those who still regarded themselves as CPSU members, it emerges, were the
most likely to oppose economic reform and to support the collectivist principles
that obtained in the communist period (see Table 5). Activists were significantly
less likely than non-members to prefer high pay and risk to job security, or to
prefer entrepreneurship to state ownership and management of the economy.
Nevertheless, party activists expressed the same levels of support as did others
for individual effort and responsibility in the economy. The divisions were
greater when respondents were asked about three different types of economic
system - capitalism, socialism and Marxism-Leninism. Once again, party acti-
vists were much more likely to identify with socialism and Marxism-Leninism,
around four out of ten giving them a positive assessment as compared with one
in four among those who had never joined its ranks. In general, the results
indicate that it is former party activists - amounting to about 5 per cent of the
population - who are distinctive in their economic attitudes, although the
differences (again) are not substantial.
Liberalization of the economy is one measure of reform; equally important
are opinions about the political system. To what extent are current or former
50
 Argumenty ifakty, 1994, no. 35, p. 3 .
51
 Ol 'ga Kryshtanovskaya, Transformatsiya staroi nomenklatury v novuyu rossiiskuyu elitu'
(unpublished manuscript, Moscow, 1994), Table 9.
52
 In January 1990,6.8 million party members (35.4 percent of the total) had a completed higher
education (Izvestiya TsK KPSS, no. 4 (1990), p. 114); this compared with 20.2 million within the
working population as a whole (Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu (Moscow: Finansy i
statistika, 1990), p. 187).
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TABLE 5 Economic Attitudes Among CPSU Members^
All Activists Never
members only members
Individualism versus collectivism
Prefers high pay, risk job security
Prefers individual effort to equal income
Prefers entrepreneurs to state ownership
Prefers individual to state responsibility
Prefers individual to state economic decision
making 35 32 33
Capitalism versus socialism
Positive view of capitalism 2 1 * * 17** 25
Positive view of socialism 40** 39** 23
Positive view of Marxist-Leninism 33** 39** 15
(AO (255) (116) (1,716)
** Statistically different from never members at p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed.
t The questions were: 'People hold different views about the economy. For each pair of statements,
which is closer to your view?'; 'We often hear the following words. What feelings do they evoke?'
Source: As for Table 2.
communist party members likely to support or oppose the political changes that
have been taking place since December 1991? And are they likely to help or to
hinder the development of more open and accountable institutions of
government? Impressionistic evidence would suggest the latter, at least to the
extent that the August 1991 conspirators were party members of senior standing;
the resistance that was offered to Yeltsin's economic reforms by the Russian
parliament, in which it was very well represented, tended in addition to support
the impression that current and former party members were strongly opposed
to many of the central elements in the postcommunist programme. At the same
time the process of democratization and market reform had been initiated by the
CPSU itself, and the draft Party Programme, approved by the Central
Committee in the summer of 1991, explicitly committed the party to a mixed
economy based upon a variety of forms of property, free prices and full
integration into the international economy, as well as to 'democracy and
freedom in all their various manifestations'.53
One approach to ascertaining opinions about democratic institutions is
obviously to ask respondents direct questions about them. This, in practice, leads
to a number of difficulties. One is that many respondents may not contest broadly
53
 Kommunist, no. 12 (1991), pp. 8, 4.
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Fig. I. Evaluation of past, present and future political systems, by CPSU members and non-members.
The questions were: 'Here is a scale for ranking systems of government. The top, plus 100, is for
the best and the bottom, minus 100, is the worst. Where on the scale would you put our system of
government before perestroika^rejen/ system of governing/our system of governing in five years'
time?'
Source: As for Table 2.
democratic principles in a survey interview, so that the questions simply elicit
the 'expected' responses. A second possible difficulty is that democracy is
generally associated with economic reform; which is considerably less popular
because of the economic hardships that have followed in its wake. The
alternative approach, used here, is to ask respondents to evaluate past, present
and future political systems on a graduated 'heaven and hell' scale. This has the
advantage that it avoids direct questions about democracy, while still
ascertaining opinions about present and future change, and at the same time it
provides a benchmark against which retrospectively to compare these opinions.
Figure 1 presents in graph form trends in support for these three very different
political systems among CPSU members and non-members.
Opinions, as we might expect, are divided about the communist system before
the perestroika of the Gorbachev years. The average for the total sample is
narrowly positive-a mean of + 7 on a scale running from —100 to
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+ 100 - but this obscures a greater degree of support for the past regime from
CPSU members ( + 9) and, more particularly, from previous activists ( + 19).
There is, however, little ambiguity about the current postcommunist regime: it
attracted generally negative evaluations from all groups, CPSU members in
particular rating it at — 45 on the scale. Finally, although all our respondents
expressed a (narrowly) positive view of the future regime, in no case was the
future evaluation higher than the evaluation of the past communist regime. Most
respondents were, in that sense, pessimistic about the political prospects for a
postcommunist Russia. Party members were nevertheless more optimistic than
those who had never joined its ranks.
The differences between party activists and the party membership as a whole
suggest that, although former members will be influential, CPSU membership
by itself is likely to play a very limited part in shaping the political direction
of postcommunist Russia. The mass public, from the late 1980s onwards,
steadily lost confidence in the ability of the CPSU to take the country out of its
crisis, and blamed its leadership for economic decline and political fragmen-
tation.54 But they were much less likely to blame the mass membership, or (for
instance) to attach any importance to the fact of party membership in their choice
of a future president.55 The CPSU, for its part, was a massive presence within
the society that it dominated, reflecting its divisions and expressing them in open
and bitter party debates from the late 1980s onwards. The party, some of its
members suggested, was 'like membership of the Anglican church for the
average Englishman', a status that was difficult to avoid in public life but one
that conveyed relatively little about the beliefs and values of its members.56 After
1991, these different views about the future of their society found expression
in a variety of competing parties, and outside politics altogether; 'current' and
'former' party members, as they identified themselves in our survey, continued
their dispute but no longer did so within the artificial unity of a single and
monopolistic CPSU.
Party members, as our survey has shown, did differ in their underlying
political philosophies from the non-party majority. These differences, however,
were almost entirely confined to the small minority who in the early 1990s
regarded themselves as current members. Former activists and other members
generally diverged very little in their responses from those that had never been
within the party's ranks. When asked about more specific policies there were
54
 In December 1989, 23 per cent of Russians 'completely trusted' the CPSU; by late 1991, just
after the coup, the level of trust was down to 2.3 per cent (hvestiya, 1 October 1991, p. 9). And who
was responsible for the crisis in which the Soviet Union found itself at the end of the 1980s? For
11.4 per cent it was 'the people' and for 17.4 per cent 'the party, including its rank and file'; but 29.2
per cent blamed 'the current party leadership', and 37.1 per cent 'former leaders' (Obshchestvennoe
mnenie v tsifrakh, 10, No. 17 (April 1990), p. 17).
55
 See, for instance, Mir mnenii i mneniya o mire, 10, No. 76 (September 1993), a Russia-wide
survey of the desired attributes of a future president.
56
 Literaturnaya gazeta, 20 February 1991, pp. 1, 3 .
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few if any significant differences, even among those who regarded themselves
as current members. In terms of their evaluation of the communist past, members
were almost as negative as non-members; and they shared the generally more
optimistic view that was taken of the prospects for a postcommunist
administration, at least in terms of its social and economic performance. Party
members were a cross-section of their society in the late communist period; in
the postcommunist era they reflect the diversity of opinion that is characteristic
of their fellow citizens.
